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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Foote's Motion to Suppress and Finding 
that Law Enforcement's Warrantless Intrusion into Mr. Foote's Apartment was 
Justified 
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Foote analyzed law enforcement's warrantless intrusion into 
his apartment on or about February 13, 2012, under the applicable Idaho case law and explained 
how law enforcement's entry and subsequent search was unlawful. Mr. Foote further explained 
how the district court's reliance on Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S.Ct. 987 (2012) and State v. Bishop, 146 
Idaho 804 (2009) was misplaced. In response the State apparently concedes that the district 
court's reliance upon Bishop was in error as it offers no argument at all to justify the district 
court's holding in that regard. Instead the State argues the welfare check upon Mr. Foote is 
analogous to the investigation of whether a juvenile intends to shoot up his school in Ryburn. 
Brief of Respondent, pp. 7 - 10. Finally, the State asks this Court to uphold the district court's 
dismissal of Mr. Foote's motion to suppress by expanding the exigent circumstances exception to 
the warrant requirement in Idaho even though this argument was not raised by the State in the 
proceedings below nor contemplated by the district court. Id. at 10 - 12. The State's arguments 
are unpersuasive and should be rejected. 
1. Law enforcement's entry into Mr. Foote's residence was not permitted under the 
exigency exception to the warrant requirement because there was no objectively 
reasonable basis for fearing that violence was imminent 
In an attempt to justify law enforcement's warrantless intrusion into Mr. Foote's 
apartment the State embellishes the factual findings of the district court with the apparent hope 
that this case will be similar to the exigency found by in Supreme Court in Ryburn. The State 
repeatedly characterizes Mr. Foote as "out of control." Brief of Respondent, pp. 7, 9, & 10 - 11. 
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The findings of the district court and the record in this case do not support this characterization. 
The district court found law enforcement was responding to a "disturbance" by a tenant 
and that the landlord was simply concerned "about something happening to the apartment." 
Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 6 - 11. When law enforcement knocked on the 
apartment door and asked Mr. Foote to come downstairs, Mr. Foote, who "looked a little 
disheveled, was disorientated, and was sweating," "put his hand in his pocket and turned back 
into the apartment." Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 69, In. 18 - p. 70, In. 4. There is no 
evidence that Mr. Foote acted crazed or aggressively towards anyone. There is no evidence 
anyone suspected Mr. Foote possessed a firearm or other weapon. There is not even evidence 
that the initial disturbance was still ongoing when law enforcement arrived at the residence and 
walked up the stairs to Mr. Foote's apartment. He simply answered the door, put his hand in his 
pocket, and walked back inside his apartment. Mr. Foote was not out of control. Contrary to the 
State's arguments, there are no objective facts supporting imminent violence in this case, and 
therefore, Ryburn is inapplicable. 
Furthermore, the assertion Mr. Foote needed protection from himself or medical 
assistance is undermined by law enforcement's testimony. In order to justify entry into a 
residence on this basis law enforcement would have had to possess known facts, together with 
reasonable inferences, at the time of entry that they needed to "render emergency assistance to an 
injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 
374-75, 209 P.3d 668, 671-72 (Ct. App. 2009). Dispatch advised law enforcement that a 
landlord was concerned about his apartment and the tenant was "yelling about missing some 
medication or something like that." Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 8, Ins. 11 - 15. Law 
enforcement subsequently knocked on Mr. Foote's door and was able to observe him. Officer 
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Adrignola testified that upon seeing Mr. Foote in the doorway Officer Adrignola no longer had a 
concern for Mr. Foote's welfare and there was no need to call an ambulance. Motion to Suppress 
Transcript, p. 13, Ins. 14 - I 9. There is no evidence of an obvious and ongoing medical 
emergency warranting life saving action. Simply put, there is no objective evidence that Mr. 
Foote needed protection from imminent injury. As such, the immediate entry into his apartment 
cannot be justified under this exception. 
2. Law enforcement should not be permitted to enter a residence without a warrant 
simply because a landlord is concerned the property is being damaged 
The State asks this Court to expand Idaho law and permit law enforcement to enter a 
residence without a warrant if there is an immediate need to protect property. Brief of 
Respondent, pp. 10 -12. In furthering this argument the State relies upon People v. Mitchell, 39 
N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976) abrogated by Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 
126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed. 2d 650 (2006), which is apparently the origin of this expansive 
"emergency exception" to the warrant requirement. The State's argument should be rejected. 
To begin with, there was no immediate need for assistance to protect property here. Upon 
arrival law enforcement was merely aware the landlord was concerned for his property at the 
time he called dispatch. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the concern or situation 
was ongoing. There is no evidence law enforcement heard anything as they walked into and 
through the landlord's house or climbed the stairs to Mr. Foote's apartment. There was also no 
evidence law enforcement saw any damage to the landlord's property. Any concern that property 
was being destroyed, even if it was, or that immediate action was necessary, was dispelled when 
the disturbance had apparently ceased. 
Accepting momentarily for the sake of argument that Mr. Foote was destroying property, 
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there is no evidence he was destroying the landlord's property. Mr. Foote may very well have 
been destroying his own personal belongings in:side the apartment. Nevertheless, at the point law 
enforcement entered Mr. Foote's apartment there were no specific facts supporting the 
proposition that Mr. Foote was destroying anything. There was simply a generalized concern. 
Perhaps most troubling about the State's argument is the outcome such a holding would 
have on a tenant's privacy rights in Idaho. Under the State's proposed expansion oflaw, anytime 
a landlord called dispatch concerned about their rental property, law enforcement would be 
permitted to enter the residence without a warrant to assure no property was about to be 
damaged. Surely this cannot be the law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Foote's Opening Brief, this Court should 
reverse the district court's decision denying Mr. Foote's Motion to Suppress and grant the motion 
thereby vacating his judgment of conviction and sentence. 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of December, 2013. 
r son 
Atto ey for Christopher Foote 
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